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COMMENTS ON THE REAPPORTIONMENT 
CONTROVERSY 
REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE SUPREME COURT 
AND CONGRESS: CONSTITUTIONAL 
STRUGGLE FOR FAIR 
REPRESENTATION* 
Robert G. Dixon, ]r.t 
"Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by 
voters, not farms or cities or economic interests,"-Chief Justice Warren, 
Reynolds v. Sims 
"But legislators do not represent faceless numbers. They represent people, or, 
more accurately, a majority of the voters in their districts-people with 
identifiable needs and interests,"-Justice Stewart, Lucas v. 44th General 
Assembly, Colorado 
T HE Supreme Court's Reapportionment Decisions
1 of June 15, 
1964, rank as one of the most far-reaching series of decisions 
in the history of American constitutionalism. Under the new equal 
population district standard, at least one house of the legislature in 
virtually every state, and in most instances both houses, are puta-
tively unconstitutional, whether or not formally so declared. 
The pathway to these decisions, which seem destined to re-make 
the political map of America, was opened in the spring of 1962 by 
• Part I of this article was adapted from an address to the Conference of Chief 
Justices, New York City, August 6, 1964. 
t Professor of Law, George Washington University.-Ed. 
1. The cases decided with full opinions after oral argument were the Alabama cases, 
Reynolds v. Sims, Vann v. Baggett, McConnell v. Baggett, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); the 
New York case, WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); the Maryland case, 
Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); the Virginia 
case, Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); the Delaware case, Roman v. Sincock, 377 
U.S. 695 (1964); and the Colorado case, Lucas v. 44th Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 
713 (1964). 
The following week the Court, using the same principles, disposed .of reapportion-
ment cases from the following states in memorandum decisions: The Michigan cases, 
Beadle v. Scholle, 377 U.S. 990 (1964), and Marshall v. Hare, 378 U.S. 561 (1964); the 
Washington case, Meyers v. Thigpen, 378 U.S. 554 (1964); the Oklahoma case, Williams 
v. Moss, 378 U.S. 558 (1964); the Illinois case, Germano v. Kerner, 378 U.S. 560 (1964); 
the Idaho case, Hearne v. Smylie, 378 U.S. 563 (1964); the Connecticut case, Pinney v. 
Butterworth, 378 U.S. 564 (1964); the Florida case, Swann v. Adams, 378 U.S. 553 (1964); 
the Ohio case, Nolan v. Rhodes, 378 U.S. 556 (1964); the Iowa case, Hill v. Davis, 378 
U.S. 565 (1964). 
[209] 
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Baker v. Carr,2 the Tennessee state legislative reapportionment case, 
in which the Supreme Court overturned well-established precedent 
and authorized federal court review under the fourteenth amendment 
of the apportionments and districts that determine the composition 
of state legislatures. For decades, reapportionment, like Pandora's 
box, was felt to be so full of intricate political factors that courts, 
particularly federal courts, should sit on the lid and never look 
inside. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter had said in an early congressional 
districting suit, courts should not enter the "political thicket" be-
cause it is "hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary 
in the politics of the people."8 In a series of cases this thought had 
become the touchstone also for state legislative apportionment. But 
the Frankfurter touchstone is now an epitaph. Courts not only have 
entered the thicket, they occupy it. 
Fair representation is the ultimate goal. At the time of the 
Reapportionment Decisions, much change was overdue in some 
states, and at least some change was overdue in most states. We are 
a democratic people and our institutions presuppose according pop-
ulation a dominant role in formulas of representation. However, by 
its exclusive focus on bare numbers, the Court may have transformed 
one of the most intricate, fascinating, and elusive problems of democ-
racy into a simple exercise of applying elementary arithmetic to 
census data. In so doing, the Court may have disableq itself from 
effectively considering the more subtle issues of representation. 
Reapportionment is a political power struggle, but one looks in 
vain in the controlling opinions in the Reapportionment Decisions 
for an awareness and concern regarding the group dynamics of 
American politics. 
I. THE DECISIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
Unlike Baker v. Carr, whose extensive opinions called for and 
merited intensive analysis,4 the series of opinions in the Reappor-
2. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
3. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1946). 
4. See, e.g., DE GRAZIA, APPORTIONMENT AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1963); 
McKay, Reapportionment and the Federal Analogy, Nat'l Municipal League Pamphlet, 
August 1962; Bickel, Black, Emerson, Goldberg, O'Brien, Pollak, Schattsneider &: 
Sindler, A Symposium on Baker v. Carr, 72 YALE L.J. 7 (1962); Dixon, Legislative 
Apportionment and the Federal Constitution, 27 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 329 (1962); 
Dixon, Representation Goals, 52 NAT'L Civ. REv. 54!1 (1963); Dixon, Apportionment 
Standards and Judicial Power, 38 NoTRE DAME LAw. 367 (1963); Hagan, The Bicameral 
Principle in State Legislatures, 11 J. PuB. L. 310 (1962); Israel, On Charting a Course 
Through the Mathematical Quagmire: The Future of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REv. 
107 (1962): Israel, Nonpopulation Factors Relevant to an Acceptable Standard of Ap-
portionment, 38 NoTRE DAME LAw. 499 (1963); Lucas, Legislative Apportionment and 
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tionment Decisions proceed from simple premises and can be sum-
marized rather readily. The principal opinion of the Court was 
delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in the Alabama case, with 
brief but consistent elaborations in separate opinions in the other 
five cases. As a basic test, the Court espoused an equal population 
district system for both houses of a bicameral legislature. This was 
variously expressed in such phrases as "substantial equality of popu-
lation among the various districts"5 and "as nearly of equal popula-
tion as is practicable."6 The Court added, as a secondary test (perhaps 
to gamer the votes of Justices Clark and Stewart for some of the 
cases), a prohibition on "crazy quilts, completely lacking in ration-
ality."7 
There were two interesting and potentially inconsistent state-
ments in the Chief Justice's principal opinion that will bear watch-
ing in the future. He spoke forcefully of the need for "fair and 
effective representation of all citizens,"8 which could point in the 
direction of representing people and viewpoints in proportion to 
their strength in the state as a whole. But later he turned about and 
seemed to reject the group dynamics of American politics by saying 
that neither "economic or other sorts of group interests" are relevant 
factors in devising a representation system.9 
Mr. Justice Stewart, who produced the principal dissent, was the 
only Justice to try to come to grips with the philosophic and practical 
complexity of the concept of representation in a large, polycentric 
society. Not willing to have the Court try to do everything, but not 
wanting the Court to do nothing, he agreed with the decision 
in three of the six cases (Alabama, Delaware and Virginia), but with 
the rationale in none. He would have remanded the Maryland case 
and would have approved the existing apportionments in the Colo-
Representative Government: The Meaning of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REv. 7ll 
(1963); McCloskey, The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REv. 54 (1962); McKay, 
Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MICH. 
L. REv. 645 (1963); McKay, The Federal Analogy and State Apportionment Standards, 
38 NoTRE DAME LAw. 487 (1963); Neal, "Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law," 1962 
SUP. CT. REv. 252. 
5. Reynolds v. Sims, '!,77 U.S. 5'!,'!,, 579 (1964). 
6. Id. at 577. 
7. Id. at 568. Because one's past always rises to haunt him, it was to be expected 
that the Chief Justice would be reminded in the public press and on the floor of 
Congress of this statement he made as Governor of California in 1958: "Many Cali-
fornia counties are far more important in the life of the State than their population of 
the State. It is for this reason that I have never been in favor of restricting the repre• 
sentation in the senate to a strictly population basis." U.S. News and World Report, 
June 6, 1964, p. '!,4; llO CoNG. R.Ec. 15516 (daily ed. July 8, 1964). 
8. '!,77 U.S. at 565, 
9. Id. at 579-80. 
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rado and New York cases. His vote to remand the Maryland case 
explains well his two guiding principles. His narrower principle, 
and the easier to apply, is that crazy quilts, i.e., patterns of appor-
tionment defying rational explanation, are bad. Because the Mary-
land Senate was based on a fairly consistent political subdivision 
principle, it passed muster for Mr. Justice Stewart under this crazy-
quilt test. But, because of a lack of sufficient data, the constitution-
ality of the Maryland Senate was not then determinable under Mr. 
Justice Stewart's broader and more difficult principle; i.e., appor-
tionments that systematically "prevent ultimate effective majority 
rule"10 are unconstitutional. It may be noted in passing that both of 
these tests find their juristic home more naturally under the due 
process clause than under the equal protection clause, which has 
come to dominate and confuse the Court's handling of apportion-
ment matters.11 
Mr. Justice Harlan wrote a fitting epilogue to Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's monumental dissenting opinion in Baker and would go back 
to pre-Baker times by dismissing all of the cases as "an experiment 
in venturesome constitutionalism."12 His historical and textual argu-
ment is overpowering, all the more so because not rebutted by Mr. 
Chief Justice Warren's opinions for the Court. But, like the 
history he used, his opinion seems destined to become history, unless 
it has some influence in the current discussions of constitutional 
amendments either to take federal courts out of the reapportionment 
business or specifically to authorize use of non-population factors 
in reapportioning one house of the legislature.13 Mr. Justice Clark, 
beyond joining in the basic opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart in the 
New York and Colorado cases, adhered to his "crazy-quilt" theory 
as expressed in his Baker opinion. He would accept non-population 
factors in one house if the other were based substantially on popula-
tion. Therefore, in terms of basic rationale, the Court split six-two-
one. There were six for a tight equal population district system; 
two, Justices Stewart and Clark, for more flexible standards, with 
preservation of majority rule and avoidance of crazy-quilts as outer 
IO. Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 677 (1964). 
II. It is now too late in the day to oust the equal protection clause from its 
charismatic role in reapportionment litigation; but for a critique on this question, 
compare Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Constitution, 27 I.Aw & 
CoNTEMP. PROB. 329, 360-66 (1962), and Dixon, Apportionment Standards and Judicial 
Power, 38 NoTRE DAME I.Aw. 367, 376-86 (1963), with McKay, Political Thickets and 
Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MICH, L. R.Ev. 645, 665-81 
(1963). 
12. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 625 (1964). 
13. See text infra at note 62 et seq. 
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boundaries; and one, Mr. Justice Harlan, for a complete hands-off 
approach. 
The Colorado case has attracted special attention and raises 
deeper philosophic issues than any of the others in the packet of 
fifteen reapportionment cases decided last June. It presented an 
apportionment plan placing one house on a straight population basis 
and the other on a modified population basis, which had been ap-
proved by every county in Colorado in a popular referendum, 
305,700 to 172,725. In the same "one man-one vote" statewide refer-
endum, an alternative plan placing both houses on a straight popula-
tion basis had been resoundingly rejected, 149,892 to 311,749. None 
of the other five cases decided on June 15-Alabama, Delaware, 
Maryland, New York, Virginia-nor the nine additional apportion-
ment cases disposed of briefly a week later, involved this popular 
referendum feature. 
How did we get ourselves so quickly to these decisions? Why is it 
that the important questions about representation that should 
engage our attention are not treated in the opinions and now stand 
unresolved-or resolved sub silentio upon inadequate premises? 
Why, with so much on the record in the law reviews,14 did so little 
show up in oral argument and in the opinions of the Court? In 
these Reapportionment Decisions, Justices Stewart and Clark, who 
dissented from the Court's results in some of the cases and from the 
Court's reasoning in all of the cases, have strong foundation in the 
law review analyses of the problem. But the Court majority has 
strong foundation in the oral argument. 
To those who sat through the Supreme Court oral arguments in 
all of the cases, as I did, the imbalance in the oral argument was at 
first annoying, then frightening, and finally, just pathetic. The 
imbalance was caused not so much by the admitted competence of 
the plaintiffs and the Solicitor General of the United States as "co-
counsel," but by the inadequacy on the defendants' side-the inade-
quacy, to be precise, in the way many state attorneys general's offices 
handled these cases. Too many of the defendants' counsel wasted 
many of their precious hours of oral argument. They dwelt on 
the varied topography and geography of their states, sounding 
like a misplaced chamber of commerce commercial; or, they stressed 
history, which, to a Court that had decided the desegregation case15 
14. See references cited note 4 supra. 
15. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), in which Mr. Chief Justice Warren 
had written: "In approaching this problem, we cannot tum the clock back to 1868 
when the Amendment was adopted .••• We must consider public education in the 
light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the 
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on broad principles of developing constitutionalism, was like trying 
to get Bertrand Russell to take Holy Communion; or, they simply 
fell into the trap Mr. Justice Clark had constructed more neatly than 
he knew in Baker,16 by trying to establish how every inter-district 
population disparity could be shown to be the result of some clear 
and "rational" formula, which is almost always an impossibility. 
A. The Representation Issue 
Few of the counsel and none of the opinions, except Mr. Justice 
Stewart's, showed an adequate awareness of the complexity of repre-
sentative government-the complexity involved in trying to achieve 
fair representation in a multi-membered body chosen from geo-
graphic districts of the many interests and groupings and shades of 
opinion in our pluralistic society. As Mr. Justice Stewart has said: 
"[L] egislators do not represent faceless numbers. They represent 
people, or, more accurately, a majority of the voters in their districts 
.... "17 The phrase "majority of the voters" is crucial, with stress on 
the word "majority." As Mr. Justice Stewart also pointed out, even 
with districts of equal population, twenty-six per cent of the elec-
torate (a bare majority of the voters in a bare majority of the dis-
tricts) can, using the same kind of theoretical mathematics that the 
Court majority used in these cases, elect a majority of the legis-
lators.18 
For the majority of the Justices in these cases, two kinds of 
mathematical data seemed to be crucial. One was the "population-
variance-ratio," computed by comparing the population of the small-
est district and the largest district, disregarding the possible atypical-
ity of the largest and the smallest district and the possibility that 
much of a state's population may be in districts having a population 
reasonably close to the average. On this basis, ratios ranging from a 
two-to-one disparity up to ten-to-one, or twenty-to-one, or even 
higher can be obtained. The other measure was a commonly used 
scale device, sometimes called the Dauer-Kelsay Scale, to indicate 
the minimum population that theoretically could control a majority 
Nation." Id. at 492-93. This was one of the decisions that invoked Professor Wechsler's, 
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959), and 
Professor Pollak's rebuttal, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to 
Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959). 
16. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 254-58 (1962). 
17. Lucas v. 44th Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 750 (1964). (Emphasis added.) 
18. On the problem of measuring malapportionment, see DAVID 8: EISENBERG, DE-
VALUATION OF THE URBAN AND SUBURBAN VOTE (1961); Clem, Measuring Legislative Mal-
apportionment: In Search of a Better Yardstick, 7 MmWESr J. PoL, SCI. 125 (1963); 
Schubert 8: Press, Measuring Malapportionment, 58 AM. PoL. SCI. REv. 302 (1964). 
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of seats in the respective houses of the legislature. The percentage 
figure is obtained by ranking the legislative districts in order of 
population and then accumulating population from the least pop-
ulous districts upward until a majority of legislative seats has 
been reached. The actual division of the population along political 
party lines is ignored. It is important to note that on this scale 
a perfect score for any one house of a legislature is not one hundred 
per cent, but fifty per cent. Also, in a large legislature, even with rela-
tively equal population districts, the minimum population that could 
control a majority of seats under this theoretical measure is only 
about thirty-seven and one-half per cent if a twenty-five per cent 
deviation from strict equality is allowed in arranging districts, and 
about forty-three and seven-tenths per cent if the allowable deviation 
is reduced to fifteen per cent.19 And yet, the scale figures of the per-
centage of the population that theoretically _could control the legis-
latures in some of the cases decided last June were close to or above 
thirty-eight per cent. For example: 
State Senate 
Virginia 41.1 % 
New York 41.8 
Colorado 33.2 
Ohio 41.0 






'\r\/hat scale figures such as these prove is uncertain. These computa-
tions treat each district as a unified entity, whereas in real life all 
districts are split internally by various partisan and interest align-
ments. 
Traditionally, American legislators have been elected, not under 
a statewide party list system or a proportional representation system, 
but instead from geographic districts, either single-member or multi-
member. And yet, our real concerns, our partisanship and our inter-
ests, are not spread evenly through these geographic districts. Nor 
are they grouped in balanced fashion in competing sets of districts. 
Herein lies the crux of the apportionment-districting problem-the 
true challenge to constitution-making. Casually drawn districts or 
19. These figures are obtained by assuming a state legislative house of one hundred 
single-member districts, each of which would have a population of ten tbousand under 
"ideal" districting. A twenty-five percent deviation would yield fifty districts of 12,500 
population and fifty districts of 7,500 population. The latter fifty districts, plus one 
of tbe larger districts, yield the minimum population tbat tbeoretically could elect a 
majority of tbe senators. The figure is 387,500 or 38.75% of tbe total state population. 
Of course, if there were a tiny legislature based only on four single-member dis-
tricts, each of which would have ten tbousand population under "ideal" districting, tbe 
percentage computations would be radically different. 
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carefully drawn districts, whether of equal population or not, may 
seriously under-represent or seriously over-represent identifiable in-
terests such as political parties, organized labor, farmers, etc. 
Actual examples of the complexity of representation and the 
insufficiency of a simple "equal population" formula are not hard to 
find. For example, a few days after the equal population rule for 
congressional districts was announced in the Wesberry20 case last 
February, Maryland's old-line legislative leaders, acting under judi-
cial pressure, provoked howls of shock and anguish by unveiling a 
plan for new, arithmetically equal districts that actually would have 
worsened the position of the under-represented suburbs that had 
brought the redistricting suit.21 The plan, subsequently passed by 
one house of the legislature but defeated in the second, carved and 
regrouped the populous counties without regard to community of 
interest in order to yield equal population districts that fully pre-
served the preexisting power structure. 
As another example, we can assume a populous urban-suburban 
area into which we are to put ten single-member districts. If the 
larger political party had a fifty-five to forty-five per cent edge over 
the smaller party and party strength were fairly evenly spread, it 
would be a simple matter to draw mathematically equal districts 
under which the party with forty-five per cent support would never 
elect a single man.22 And, it would not even be necessary to engage 
in gerrymandering in the sense of odd-shaped districts. The in-
equities in these examples are caused by what can be designated as 
the "wild card" factor of party member location, plus some gerry-
mandering. 
But there are other possible causes of gross inequities, even 
under an equal population standard. A second cause is the familiar 
20. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
21. N.Y. Times, March 8, 1964, p. 86, col. 4. In the case that impelled the action, 
the federal district court subsequently voided the original districts but allowed their 
use for the 1964 election. Maryland Citizens Comm. for Fair Congressional Redistrict-
ing v. Tawes, 226 F. Supp. 80, 228 F. Supp. 956 (D. Md. 1964). 
22. For another example, consider the following diagram: 
Seats After 
Seats Before "Equalizing" 
Party Party Total Reappor- Reappor-
X y Population tionment tionment 
County A 5,000 20,000 25,000 1 1 
County B 55,000 45,000 100,000 1 4 
Before reapportionment: Each party, one seat. Party votes split 60,000 to 65,000. 
After reapportionment: Party X, 60,000 votes, four seats; 
Party Y, 65,000 votes, one seat. 
Source: This chart is taken from Dixon, Representation Goals, supra note 4, at 545. 
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balance of power factor. A significant interest group over-representa-
tion can occur when a minority religious, racial, or dogmatic interest 
group holds the balance of power in a series of districts. The Pro-
hibitionists proved this by going ~11 the way and even obtaining a 
constitutional amendment. Fear of this balance of power factor may 
be one explanation for the Colorado popular referendum in 1962. 
The voters there rejected a straight equal population principle for 
both houses and approved a plan placing one house on something 
less than an equal population principle. Why? One reasonably plau-
sible explanation would be that some urban and suburban voters 
may have voted for under-representation in one house in order to 
better protect interests they shared with others in the state-and 
which may be dominant interests when the state is taken as a whole. 
But, a majority of the United States Supreme Court Justices, without 
discussing this point, were singularly unimpressed with the refer-
endum and nullified the voter-selected apportionment plan in last 
June's packet of reapportionment cases.23 
A third cause of gross inequities, even under an equal popula-
tion standard, may be the possible operation of multi-member dis-
tricts. The populous urban-suburban centers in the South provide 
interesting examples of this in regard to two minorities-the Repub-
licans and the Negroes. If single-member districts are used, the 
housing patterns in some populous areas will produce some Repub-
lican seats and some Negro seats. But, if the legislators are chosen 
in large, plural-member districts, the Negroes and the Republicans 
will be swamped despite their substantial numbers.24 These are the 
kinds of things that can happen if courts simply flush uncontrolled 
action out of the political thicket. In short, a one man-one vote 
principle guarantees change; taken alone, it may not always guar-
antee fair representation, which should be the ultimate goal. 
Numbers are easy to play with so long as they remain mere 
numbers. If, as Aristotle said, "Law is reason unaffected by desire," 
the reapportionment opinions of Mr. Chief Justice Warren show 
up well as an ideal prescription for a theoretical society. But if what 
the Founding Fathers called "factionalism" rears its ugly head, and 
if, as Justice Holmes said, "The life of the law has not been logic; 
it has been experience," then the Warren opinions are inadequate. 
Why are all these interesting, perplexing, realistic, and trouble-
some matters simply swept under the rug in the majority opinions 
23. Lucas v. 44th Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964). 
24. For further discussion and examples, see Jewell, State Legislatures in Southern 
Politics, 26 J. OF PoL. 177 (1964). 
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in the reapportionment cases? The answer may be found in the way 
the Court has characterized the basic nature of a reapportionment 
case. The Court views all these cases as simply being civil rights 
cases, involving the personalized right of the individual voter to cast 
a vote that will have "equal weight" with the votes of all other voters. 
(And the Court does this even though the basic data used is popula-
tion data, not voting pattern data.)25 In one sense, of course, these 
cases do involve voting. But, by this exclusive characterization, the 
Court ignores the crucial point that in apportionment cases the 
personal civil right of the voter is intertwined with large, overriding 
questions concerning representation-i.e., concerning political phi-
losophies and practices of representation in a dynamically democratic 
public order, in which groups are as relevant as individuals. Indeed, 
groups and parties are the building blocks of political power. Be-
cause apportionment involves the creation and control of political 
power, the group dynamics of American politics cannot be ignored 
forever in reapportionment litigation, although it has received little 
attention in this "first round" of reapportionment cases. 
Moreover, even as a civil rights case, the Court's formulation of 
an arithmetic absolute of equal population districts is a marked 
departure from previous constructions of the equal protection clause. 
Except in regard to race, where we have sought to erect-and I think 
properly-a concept of a color-blind Constitution, judicial inter-
pretations of the equal protection clause have stressed respect for 
legislative discretion and a flexible approach toward legislative 
classifications. McGowan v. Maryland26 and the other Sunday closing 
cases illustrate this well. 
Further, if the goal, however arrived at in terms of constitutional 
source, be to weigh each voter's vote equally and thereby to give 
each voter an equally effective vote, this is a deceptive concept, 
impossible to achieve in practice, as the previous illustrations demon-
strate. In any election in any district system, there is a minority that 
is weighted at zero and a majority who elects its man or its slate 
and so is weighted, at least until the next election, at one hundred 
25. Some persons have suggested that the proper data to examine in apportion-
ment-malapportionment studies is not population data but data on the number of 
potential voters, or of registered voters, or of actual voters. Wholly apart from the 
question of theoretical merit, attempts to use indices more refined than the readily 
available census data, or to work out a political participation index as an apportion-
ment factor, have normally been rejected because of the additional effort involved. 
See Silva, Legislative Representation-With Special Reference to New York, 27 LAw &: 
CoNTEMP. PROB. 408 (1962): Silva, Making Votes Count, 52 NAT'L C1v. REv. 489 (1963). 
26. 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). In this case, Mr. Chief Justice Warren said: "A statutory 
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived 
to justify it.'' Id. at 426. 
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per cent. Some vote weighting necessarily is involved in any sys-
tem for the election of a multi-membered body from separate 
districts. How these one hundred per cent majorities and zero minor-
ities add up across a state is the important issue in assessing the 
fairness of the system and its effectiveness in representing the various 
organized and unorganized interests that make up the body politic. 
Semantics have helped to impede clarity of thought in this field. 
For example, "equal population" is an objective term with clear 
meaning; but, the terms "equal representation" and "equal vote-
weighting," which are sometimes used as substitutes, are subjective 
terms that have ~o clear meaning. These latter terms describe prob-
lems; they do not label anything. Judicial creation of equal popula-
tion districts, without more, cannot be counted on to produce either 
"equally weighted" votes or "equally effective" votes. 
B. Implications of "One Man-One Vote" 
Let us now take the goal of "one man-one vote" or "equal vote 
weighting" at face value and inquire into its implications. If we are 
serious about "one man-one vote," we will want to maximize the 
prospects for it being an efjective vote. The question then naturally 
arises whether the one man-one vote principle includes a right to 
have a large area divided into single-member districts, so that a 
sizable cluster of like-minded people will not be submerged as a 
permanent minority in a large multi-member district. Mr. Chief 
Justice Warren, in what I think was a rather casual dictum since 
the point was not before him, intimated in his opinion for the Court 
in the Alabama case, Reynolds v. Sims,27 that a state could elect to 
use single-member districts, multi-member districts, or floterial dis-
tricts,28 as long as there was substantial equality of population among 
the various districts. In regard to multi-member districts, he did 
suggest some practical problems, such as length of ballot and burden 
on the voter, but he gave no hint of constitutional restraint. 
Two lower federal courts, however, already have suggested that 
the equal protection clause may require breaking up multi-member 
districts into single-member districts. Under a statute voided by a 
federal district court in Georgia last March,29 some voters had their 
27. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
28. 377 U.S. at 577-83, 686 n.2. A "floterlal district" is one that includes within its 
boundaries several separate districts or political subdivisions that independently would 
not be entitled to additional representation but whose conglomerate population en-
titles the entire area to another seat in the particular legislative body being appor-
tioned. 
29. Dorsey v. Fortson, 228 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Ga.), prob. juris. noted, 33 U.S.L. 
WE!i:K. 3127 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1964). 
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own state senator in a single-member district. Other voters who were 
located in populous counties having more than one senator were 
under a system whereby each senator was chosen at large in the 
county even though assigned, for representation purposes, to a sub-
district in the county where he also had to have his residence. The 
court held that there was unconstitutional discrimination between 
the single-member district voters, who "owned their man" so to 
speak, and the voters in the sub-districts in the plural member 
counties, who might be represented by a man elected by the county 
at large but disfavored by the very sub-district he represented. It 
doesn't take much imagination to see that this system could operate, 
and perhaps was designed to operate, to overcome sub-district major-
ities that vote contrary to the county-wide majority. 
In Pennsylvania, a federal district court last April held that both 
political philosophy and constitutional law prohibited the use of 
multi-member districts along with single-member districts.30 The 
court said "one man-one vote" means that each voter must vote for 
the same number of legislators. Otherwise, some voters would have 
only one legislator looking out for their interest; others would have 
two, three, or four, although, of course, their districts might be two, 
three, or four times larger. The court added the more respectable 
rationale that "minority groups living in particular localities may 
well be submerged in elections at large but can often make their 
voting power much more effective in the smaller single-member 
district in which they may live."31 
I am not prepared to say that the Georgia decision, or even the 
Pennsylvania decision, is wholly wrong, despite the Warren dictum. 
Indeed, if "fair representation" is the true, but unarticulated, goal 
in all of these apportionment matters, then I rather like these deci-
sions. But I would find it highly amusing-if it were not so indica-
tive of how little we have thought through this critical problem-
to compare these lower federal court decisions, which suggest that 
equal protection requires the formation of single-member voting 
districts, with comments by both Justices Stewart32 and Harlan33 
in the recent reapportionment cases that state-wide election at large 
of all legislators could be the ultimate outcome of the one man-
one vote principle espoused by the Court majority. Lately we have 
heard much of the merit of "neutral principles," i.e., precise and 
30. Drew v. Scranton, 229 F. Supp. 310 (M.D. Pa. 1964), appeal docketed, 32 U.S.L. 
WEEK 3449 (U.S. June 19, 1964) (No. 1237); for subsequent history, see asterisk footnote 
on page 242. 
31. Id. at 327. 
32. 377 U.S. 713, 731 n.21 (1964). 
33. 377 U.S. 533, 622 n.82 (1964). 
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consistent principles, for constitutional adjudication. Apparently, 
the one man-one vote principle is better than a mere neutral prin-
ciple; i~ is a chameleon principle which can yield opposite conclu-
sions. 
If in the next year or two the Supreme Court should act on a case 
of this sort, I would expect the plea for a constitutional right to sub-
districting to receive respectful consideration. Indeed, if the first 
case were one brought by a racial minority, I would be inclined to 
expect the Court to require sub-districting as a further offshoot of 
equal protection. As I see it, the New York City congressional dis-
tricts case, Wright v. Rockefeller,34 which the plaintiffs lost, is a 
different case and would not stand in the way. And, if the Court 
ordered sub-districting for an impacted and unrepresented racial 
minority, I do not see how they could refuse to do so for an impacted 
political party minority. The basic democratic interest in each case 
would be the same-to achieve at least some representation of a 
particular viewpoint in a multi-membered deliberative body. 
One more very recent case on the "frontier of equal protection" 
should be noted. In South Carolina, as in a few other states, there 
is a requirement that, in at-large voting in plural member districts, 
each voter, in order to have his votes counted, must vote for all 
offices even though his own party has nominated only one or two 
men. In a case filed last June before a federal district court in South 
Carolina, 85 it is being contended that this provision is unconstitu-
tional under the equal protection clause as applied to the election 
of ten members of the state legislature from Richland County. The 
Democrats nominated a full slate of ten men, but the Republicans 
nominated only two men. The gist of the complaint is that this 
system can be mathematically sho·wn to endanger and possibly frus-
84. !176 U.S. 52 (1964). 
!15. Boineau v. Thornton, Civ. No. AC-1465, E.D.S.C., Aug. 10, 1964 (complaint 
dismissed), afj'd per curiam, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3141 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1964), petition for re-
hearing filed, Oct. 30, 1964. 
The petition for rehearing filed in the Supreme Court in Boineau, supra, stresses 
very properly the anomaly of the Court's action in affirming the South Carolina case 
without oral argument at a time when oral argument had been scheduled in the 
Georgia case, Fortson v. Dorsey (see note 29 supra), and a request for review and oral 
argument was pending in the Pennsylvania case, Drew v. Scranton (see note !10 supra). 
All three of these cases raise interrelated aspects of one central problem, i.e., the rela-
tion of the new "one man-one vote" philosophy to multi-member district systems, to 
the subtleties of gerrymandering which may be associated with such systems, and to 
voting arrangements within multi-member districts. 
For the Court to stop now, or to continue to make major reapportionment deci-
sions on the basis of inadequate briefs and argument, would be most unfortunate. If 
well handled, full dress argument in Dorsey, Drew, and Boineau could illuminate, for 
the first time, the political realities and deeper philosophic issues of representation 
that have been ignored so far in most reapportionment litigation. 
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trate equal vote-weighting and majority rule. For example, let us 
assume, as in South Carolina, that with ten men to be elected at 
large in a county to a given class of office such as state legislator, 
Party A puts up only two men and Party B puts up a full slate of 
ten. If the per cent of total voters who favor Party A's two men are 
a majority and if they cast their "other" votes for the same B Party 
men, then this group of voters will elect all its choices (2A, SB). 
However, if this same majority of total voters who favor Party A's 
two men should happen to evenly spread their "other" votes over 
the full ten-man slate of Party B, then the men nominated by Party 
A will lose unless they have the support of more than seventy-two 
per cent of the total number of voters. Between these two mathe-
matical extremes lie the actual voting patterns. But, the crucial point 
is that, even with support of a majority of the voters, Party A's two 
men may lose if their supporters spread their remaining votes at 
random over the Party B slate. To this extent, the South Carolina 
law leaves majority rule to chance, which seems contrary both to the 
spirit and to the language of the majority opinions in the Reappor-
tionment Decisions. 
C. Reapportionment and the Vigor of State Government 
Seeing in Baker v. Carr the "death knell of minority state gov-
ernment,"36 many commentators have predicted that reapportion-
ment would lead to a great resurgence of state government, a 
heightened concern for urban problems at state capitals, and a 
lessened need for direct federal-local relations to solve urban prob-
lems. These thoughts have been common in social science and 
popular literature for decades. The Kestnbaum Commission on 
intergovernmental relations highlighted these same thoughts in its 
1955 report.37 They are repeated in a report on apportionment 
issued by the United States Advisory Commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations.38 
There undoubtedly is some foundation for these observations, 
although there is precious little proof of actual minority rule. How-
ever, data compiled by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergov-
ernmental Relations in another study provides some sobering sta-
36. Address by Charles Rhyne, past president of the American Bar Association, gen-
eral counsel of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, and one of the 
counsel in Baker v. Carr, delivered before the New York University Alumni Associa-
tion a few months after Baker v. Carr. 
37. COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS {KEsrNBAUM COMMISSION), RE-
PORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1955). 
38. U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, APPORTIONMENT OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES (1962). 
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tistics.89 The study surveys the relatively dismal record of attempts 
in the years 1950-1961 to achieve city-consolidation or other major 
governmental integration in eighteen metropolitan areas. Enhanced 
ability to serve urban needs was a major purpose of the plans. But 
ten of the eighteen failed to pass the popular referendum hurdle, 
even though the vote was not state-wide, but rather was confined to 
the m~tropolitan area. In almost every instance, the specter of higher 
taxes, whether real or fancied, was a major argument of the oppo-
nents and presumably a major factor in the defeats. The commen-
tators on the St. Louis experience said: "Taxpayers are strangely 
immune to arguments [explaining tax provisions] and many voters 
were convinced that adoption of the district would mean a sub-
stantial tax increase."40 Another major difficulty was voter apathy-
people are not concerned enough to favor increased local action on 
metropolitan problems. 
Looking to the future, whatever reapportionment may accom-
plish, it does not seem to be well-adapted as a remedy for voter 
apathy and tax fears. In order to bring state government into its 
place in the sun as a major vehicle for solving urban problems and 
restraining the power flow to Washington, reapportioned legislatures 
are going to have to vote higher taxes. The needs for service and 
control in such matters as transportation and transit, housing, slum 
clearance and renewal, health, welfare, employment, and the like 
are expensive. Even under reapportionment, continued reliance 
upon federal programs and funds may seem to be the path of polit-
ical wisdom for state and local politicians. Census Bureau and 
Budget Bureau reports on state and local government finances reveal 
a fairly heavy reliance upon federal funds.41 
Another common idea that was seriously questioned by the Ad-
visory Commission study of "metro plan" defeats is that reorganiza-
tion plans carry in urban areas but fail to get a concurrent majority 
-where that is also required-in the outer reaches of the proposed 
new district. "Of the 18 proposals surveyed," according to the report, 
39. U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON lNTERC:OVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FACTORS AFFECT· 
ING VOTER REACTIONS TO GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAS (1962). 
40. Id. at 21. 
41. Annual federal grants-in-aid to state and local governments have risen from 
three billion to 7.5 billion dollars in the period from 1955 to 1962, and the trend 
continues. Bureau of the Budget figures, reported in U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION, 
PERIODIC CONGRESSIONAL REASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID TO STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS 67 (1961). Although federal payments directly to local governments 
provided less than two per cent of local general revenues in 1960, new federal legisla-
tion in 1961 is expected to increase these amounts significantly during the next several 
years. Bureau of the Census figures, reported in U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION, LOCAL 
NON-PROPERTY TAXES AND THE COORDINATING ROLE OF THE STATE 18 (1961). 
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"only 2 of the IO which failed of adoption owed their defeat directly 
to the demand for concurrent majorities .... "42 Two that passed 
would have failed if a concurrent majority had been required. 
The Commission also noted that, in twelve of the eighteen, "plural-
ities ran parallel in the central and the outlying parts of the area 
concerned, favorably in six instances and unfavorably in the other 
six."•a 
The tiny handful of empirical studies of urban-rural conflict in 
the actual operation of state legislatures likewise provides no basis 
for supposing that reapportionment will be a panacea for the ills of 
urbanized society. Separate studies of the Illinois and Missouri legis-
latures conducted a few years ago by Professors George D. Young 
and David R. Derge indicated that "the city's bitterest opponents in 
the legislature are political enemies from within its own walls, and 
those camped in the adjoining suburban areas." The research 
supported these findings: 44 
"I. Non-metropolitan legislators seldom vote together with 
high cohesion against metropolitan legislators. 
"2. Metropolitan legislators usually do not vote together with 
high cohesion. 
"3. Metropolitan legislators are usually on the prevailing side 
when they do vote together with high cohesion." 
A separate study by Professors Steiner and Gove of the effects of 
the 1955 reapportionment on the Illinois legislature concluded that 
there were "no profound changes," but that Republican suburban 
politics had become more competitive.45 
D. Remaining Problems 
Characterization. Looking to the future, I see a number of re-
maining problems and a number of creative possibilities. The first 
need, I think, is to characterize correctly what these cases are all 
about and the effect the court orders unavoidably will have. In 
reapportionment cases, courts sit in judgment on the structure of 
political power; they even effect a judicial transfer of political power. 
Thus, to speak in terms of distribution of political power is to talk 
not of legislative acts and not of judicial acts in the previously ac-
42. U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, op. dt. supra 
note 39, at 27. 
43. Ibid. 
44. Derge, Metropolitan and Outstate Alignments in Illinois and Missouri Legisla• 
tive Delegations, 52 AM. Pot. SCI. R.Ev. 1065 (1958), incorporating findings of George D. 
Young, The 1958 Special Session of the Missouri General Assembly, Missouri Political 
Science Association Newsletter, No. 3 (1958). 
45. STEINER 8c: GOVE, LEGISLATIVE POLITICS IN ILLINOIS 132 (1960). 
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cepted concept of judicial review, but rather to talk of constitutive 
acts. Reapportionment re-structures government at the core. In 
taking on this task, the courts have assumed the function of a state 
constitutional convention. To an extent, of course, such a function 
is implicit in much judicial review under the federal supremacy 
principle that is derived from the supreme law of the land clause. 
But the task is especially grave in a reapportionment case because 
of the delicacy and intricacy of the policy issues involved and the 
superficiality of all "quickie" formulas. 
Significantly, of all the vital compromises at the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787, only the one concerning the basis of representa-
tion is entitled to be called the Great Compromise. Apportionment 
and districting decisions are determinative of the quality of repre-
sentative democracy. From popular suffrage derives the majoritarian 
principle of democracy. From apportionment and districting derive 
the representation features that temper majoritarianism with re-
quirements of deliberation and consensus. 
Perception of the true nature of reapportionment litigation 
should help clear up the semantical bog of "one man-one vote" and 
"equal representation." It should eliminate the misconception that 
the cases involve only a sharply pin-pointed issue of civil rights. It 
also should open the way to a fresh dialogue-long overdue-about 
the character and function of representation in a twentieth century 
mass democracy. 
Political Data. Although the judiciary is well launched on a 
stormy sea of reapportionment litigation, there is not nearly enough 
information available for intelligent decision-making. Apart from 
the overt act of casting a ballot, little is known about the manner in 
which political feelings are translated into action, the actual effect 
of malapportionment, or the identity of the beneficiaries of reap-
portionment. One recent study of the lower house of Congress, in 
which congressmen's votes on four issues were weighted by the pop-
ulation of their districts and recomputed, rather surprisingly suggests 
that the "liberals" benefit from such congressional maldistricting as 
now exists.46 A weighted vote recomputation of all roll call votes in 
the current session of Congress (lower house) that I have under way 
so far shows little change in the totals. A study of twenty-two roll 
call votes in two sessions of the Texas legislature, using this same 
technique of recomputing legislators' votes according to the popula-
tion of their districts, indicates that the outcome would have differed 
46. HACKER, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICIING 90 (196!1). 
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on only one measure.47 This then is an area where political science, 
unfortunately, has let us down rather badly. We know very little 
about the actual operation of legislatures and the relationships 
between legislators and their constituencies. 
Effective Representation. The matter of standards will need per-
petual refinement as legislators develop new patterns of apportion-
ment under which some identifiable group is disproportionately 
represented. It is demonstrably impossible to arrange districts of 
equal population under which no groups or political parties are 
specially advantaged or disadvantaged. The problem I speak of here 
is far more delicate, and probably far more important, than the 
abstract one of ascertaining how much district inequality may be 
tolerated under the Court's mandate for "an honest and good faith 
effort" to achieve districts "as nearly of equal population as is 
practicable." That could be a meaningless fight over percentage 
points. The more critical problem is to put real meaning into the 
language found in another part of Mr. Chief Justice Warren's opin-
ion, where he characterized the goal as being "full and effective 
participation by all citizens in state government."48 A few lines 
farther on he stated even more clearly that "fair and effective 
representation for all citizens is concededly the basic aim of legisla-
tive apportionment."49 
To achieve this goal, I suggest that the Court will have to move 
fonvard in two directions beyond the equal population principle. 
In one direction, it will have to join Mr. Justice Stewart in his con-
47. McDonald, Legislative Malapportionment and Roll Call Voting in Texas: 1960· 
1963, M.A. Thesis, Univ. of Tex., 1964. Studies of this sort necessarily ignore the dif• 
ferences in nominations, campaigns, and elections that might have resulted from re• 
apportionment or redistricting. 
The technique of weighting each legislator's vote by the actual popular population 
of his district has also been suggested as a species of remedy for malapportionment. 
The New Mexico Legislature, under strong judicial pressure to reapportion, approved 
in 1963 a weighted vote system as a way of achieving "one man-one vote" apportion-
ment. The plan was nullified by a state court because it was thought to be inconsis• 
tent with state constitutional clauses providing that for various purposes various 
percentages of "members" shall cast votes. Cargo v. Campbell, Santa Fe County Dist. 
Ct., N.M., Jan. 8, 1964. The Court did not discuss the possible overriding force of the 
fourteenth amendment. Documents and press clippings concerning the "weighted vot-
ing" battle in New Mexico are collected in Irion, Apportionment of the New Mexico 
Legislature, Univ. of N.M. Dep't of Gov't Research Report, 1964. 
This past July a district court in Washington, after declaring the existing lcgisla• 
ture invalid, suggested a weighted voting scheme as the most appropriate form of 
relief. Thigpen v. Meyers, 231 F. Supp. 938 (W.D. Wash. 1964). However, because all 
parties felt the plan was unworkable, e.g., committee assignments, the court reconsidered 
and deleted this relief in its October 5 decree and allowed continued use of the 
"invalid" districts for one year. 
48. 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1944). 
49. Ibid. 
December 1964] Reapportionment Symposium 227 
cem for "ultimate effective majority rule."50 It will have to be 
disposed to act against gerrymander devices, whereby a political 
party spreads its voters over enough districts to control a majority 
of seats, even though it is a minority party in the state as a whole. 
In the opposite direction, it should be disposed to act against gross 
and continued under-representation of a minority party or group 
that finds itself so distributed and "locked into" a district system that 
its votes, though substantial, always achieve zero representation. 
Hearing from the Minority. I would venture the prediction that, 
as we move into a new era of equal population districts, we will see 
a renewed interest in various governmental devices to "hear from 
the minority." Students of government have known for years that 
the single-member district system has a strong tendency to over-
represent the majority party. I think this well-known tendency may 
be enhanced, rather than lessened, by the equal population require-
ment. Indeed, one of the few respectable functions of the old "rotten 
borough system" was occasionally to give the minority party exag-
gerated representation from some districts in order to offset their 
total loss in other areas where they were a sizable, but perpetually 
submerged, minority. If this hunch is correct, we soon may see a 
renewed interest in such "hear from the minority" devices as pro-
portional representation,51 cumulative voting (which has been prac-
ticed in Illinois for years),52 and limited voting. For example, a 
limited voting system was recently put into effect in New York City 
in order to improve political party balance in the city council. Its 
constitutionality was sustained in state litigation, and the United 
States Supreme Court denied review.53 
50. Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 677 (1964). 
51. Under proportional representation no single-member districts are used. All 
candidates run at large, and all voters rank the candidates in order of their preferences 
or vote for party lists. The aim is to have each group represented in the legislature in 
direct proportion to its numerical strength. In this country, much opposition to 
proportional representation stems from the fear that it would encourage each minority 
to run a few candidates, and thus break down the two-party system and lead to un-
stable, coalition governments. See HERMENS, DEMOCRACY OR ANARCHY? A STUDY OF 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION (1941); UKEMAN, VOTING IN DEMOCRACIES: A STUDY OF 
MAJORITY AND PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (1955); Laughlin, Proportional Repre-
sentation: It Can Cure Our Apportionment Ills, 49 A.B.A.J. 1065 (1963). 
52. The Illinois cumulative voting system, which is not being used this year be• 
cause of the special election at large, has in the past ensured minority party representa-
tion in the lower house of the Illinois legislature. Representatives are elected from 
plural member districts each having three legislators; each voter has three votes which 
he can allocate all to one man, divide between two men, or spread evenly among three 
candidates. See ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 7; Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. l (1944); LAKEMAN, 
op. cit. supra note 41. See also BLAIR, CUMULATIVE VOTING: AN EFFECTIVE ELECTORAL 
DEVICE IN ILLINOIS POLITICS (1960); Blair, The Case for Cumulative Voting in Illinois, 
47 Nw. U.L. REv. 344 (1952). 
53. Some minority party representation is guaranteed in New York's City Council 
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Remedies. Lastly, I would like to add a word concerning reme-
dies, about which the Court said little in the recent decisions. There 
has been much loose talk about the device of an election at large, 
including statements to the effect that it squarely accords with the 
one man-one vote principle. In a literal sense, the at-large election 
does yield one man-one vote. But, in a functional sense, it does not 
provide fair representation, yielding instead only a winner-take-all 
majoritarianism. The battle cry has been "one man-one vote," but 
what the plaintiffs really have been complaining about is lack of 
weight in the legislature commensurate with their numbers. An 
election at large, therefore, is not a remedy in the sense of being an 
alternative and better representation system. From the standpoint 
of representation, it creates more problems than it solves. Rather, it 
is a sanction to compel change and, hopefully, improvement in the 
representation system. 
A judicial order in the nature of an actual reapportionment 
would be an ultimate remedy in the true sense of the term. At 
least three of the handful of examples so far of direct judicial re-
apportionment have involved judicial choice and designation from 
among prefabricated proposals originating in the legislature, as in 
Alabama;54 or from plans emanating from a state-sponsored research 
bureau, as in Oklahoma;55 or from a special legislative apportion-
ment commission, as in Michigan.56 To ensure that the court will 
have available this kind of advice and assistance, both at the reme-
dies stage and earlier, it would be advisable to develop a practice 
of intervention by political party chairmen in reapportionment suits, 
as was allowed in Connecticut.57 When courts must act politically, 
they at least should not act blindly. 
In devising remedies, the courts also should guard against undue 
by the new provision that enlarges the Council by adding two members at large for 
each borough, but that allows each party to nominate only one at-large candidate in 
each borough and each voter to cast only one vote for the office. The provision was 
sustained in Blaikie v. Power, 13 N.Y.2d 134, 243 N.Y.S.2d 185, 193 N.E.2d 55 (196!!), 
appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 4!19 (1964). See MACKENZIE, FREE ELECTIONS 55-56 (1958). 
54. Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962), afj'd sub nom. Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
55. Moss v. Burkhart, 220 F. Supp. 149 (N.D. Okla. 196!!), afj'd sub nom. Williams 
v. Moss, 378 U.S. 558 (1964). 
56. In re Apportionment of Legislature, 372 Mich. 418, 126 N.W .2d 731 (1964) and 
subsequent opinions and order filed June 22 and 24, 1964. Contrast State v. Zimmer-
man, 22 Wis. 2d 544, 126 N.W.2d 551 and 128 N.W.2d 16 (Wis. 1964). 
57. Butterworth v. Dempsey, 229 F. Supp. 754 (D. Conn. 1964), afj'd sub nom. Pinney 
v. Butterworth, 378 U.S. 564 (1964). In this case, and in a later filed suit concerning 
Connecticut congressional districts, both the Republican and Democratic state chair-
men intervened. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1964, p. 49, col. I; id. March 8, 1964, p. 75, cols. 
2-4. 
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haste, because they are dealing with eggs that, once scrambled, cannot 
be put back in the shell. How anomalous it is to contrast the "hell-
bent for election" speed with which some courts approach reappor-
tionment with the lengthy delay and procrastination in desegrega-
tion of public education. Desegregation is conceptually far more 
simple than legislative apportionment and, unlike reapportionment, 
is almost exclusively a matter of vindicating a personalized civil 
right. And yet, in desegregation we have had "all deliberate speed" 
over a ten-year period, whereas in reapportionment we have been 
treated to the spectacle of courts pressuring and threatening legis-
lators and fixing exact deadlines measured in months, or even weeks. 
The initial order entered by the federal district court in Connec-
ticut seemed to be an unprecedented example of judicial regulation 
of the political process.58 In that order the court set up a timetable 
for three special elections within a ten-month period and called for 
an immediate special session of the legislature to set up the mechan-
ics for a constitutional convention. It also said that the legislature 
elected under the old apportionment formula in November 1964 
should conduct no public business other than implementing con-
stitutional changes made by the constitutional convention. At this 
point the Governor remonstrated and the court accepted a modified, 
but still speedy, plan. Under it, a special session of the legislature 
was to meet on September 10, 1964, to perform the two-fold task of 
itself reapportioning the state in time for the November 1964 
election and arranging for a constitutional convention to make a 
permanent apportionment. When the special session failed to reap-
portion the districts in accordance with directions, the court can-
celled the November elections for a new legislature. It then ruled 
that the 1963 legislature can continue to legislate provided it 
reapportions within ninety days. The court will appoint a special 
master to operate concurrently with a new special legislative session. 
He will hold public hearings and will be empowered to use elec-
tronic computers to establish a new apportionment. If the legislature 
fails to create a reapportionment schedule by January 30, 1965, the 
special master's plan will be imposed on the state.59 Judicial pressure 
58. N.Y. Times, July 24, 1964, p. 28, col. 3; id. July 28, 1964, p. 30, col. ll. 
Following the failure of the special legislative session to agree on an acceptable 
redistricting plan, the district court took the apparently unprecedented step of can-
celling the Nov. 3, 1964, election and requesting counsel to draw up a new timetable 
to include an early special election, a special legislative session to reapportion tem-
porarily, and a constitutional convention to reapportion the state permanently. N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 25, 1964, p. 1, cols. 7-8. 
59. Id., OcL 30, 1964, p. 26, col. 8. 
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to force an immediate reapportionment on the eve of the November 
1964 election (e.g., Michigan, Oklahoma), or to limit the life or 
powers of the legislatures to be elected in November 1964 under 
unmodified apportionment plans (e.g., Vermont), or to schedule 
special elections (e.g., New York) has been common in many states.00 
E. Conclusion 
In reapportionment there are no "easy outs." I cannot reject 
Baker v. Carr out of hand and join Mr. Justice Harlan on the Olym-
pian heights of judicial detachment, even though I must admit that 
his opinions are challenging. On his side he has constitutional text, 
history, and logic. 
There seem to be times, however, despite the instinctive prefer-
ence for "neutral principles," when judicial review becomes judicial 
prescription. Such times must be rare, else there can be no judicial 
"review." But, when they do occur, perhaps the best one can do is 
to revert to these lines of Mr. Chief Justice John Marshall-so won-
derfully useful because so semantically meaningless: "We must never 
forget that it is a constitution we are expounding." The highest 
commitment is to the viability of the system and to the maintenance 
of popular faith in it. With political avenues for redress of malap-
portionment blocked in many states and with protest mounting, 
the Court has concluded that some judicial participation in the 
politics of the people is a pre-condition to there being any effective 
politics of the people. However, at the same time I fear that the 
Court, having entered the fray, will find its simple one man-one 
vote standard to be more like a set of Emperor's clothes than a 
shining suit of democratic armor. 
The questions raised in this paper do not demonstrate the in-
validity of the equal population district principle. They may demon-
strate its insufficiency as an exclusive guide to fair representation. 
A representative democracy may be sufficiently majoritarian to 
guarantee majority, rather than minority, rule; but, an excess of 
the majoritarian principle may rob the system of its representative 
character and may yield action without accommodation.61 
60. For a round-up story, see U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 24, 1964, pp. 40-41. 
The New York order (N.Y. Times, July 28, 1964, p. 1, col. 1) was promptly appealed to 
the United States Supreme Court, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1964, p. 27, col. I. In late 
August, Mr. Justice White denied a stay of the Oklahoma federal district court's order 
nullifying a May 1964 primary and ordering a new primary for Sept. 29, 1964. N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 27, 1964, p. 25, col. 6. 
61. For further elaboration of this thought, see BUCHANAN &: TULLOCK, THE CAL-
CULUS OF CONSENT (1962); Dixon, Representation Goals, 52 NAT'L CIV. REv. 543 (1963). 
December 1964] Reapportionment Symposium 231 
II. NOTES ON CONGRESSIONAL POWER OVER JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
LEGISLATIVE .APPORTIONMENT62 
Judicial rulings impelling drastic political changes can be ex-
pected to induce sharp political reactions, and the Supreme Court's 
Reapportionment Decisions of June 15, 1964, nullifying both 
houses of most state legislatures in the nation, was no exception. 
By mid-August the House Judiciary Committee under Chairman 
Emanuel Celler had held eight days of hearings on a package of 
more than 130 bills introduced by 99 members, but he did not report 
out a bill. At this point, Congressman Wiliam M. Tuck of Virginia 
by-passed the Celler Committee. With the aid of the Rules Com-
mittee headed by his fellow Virginian, Howard W. Smith, he 
brought to the House floor a bill to strip the federal courts of all 
power over state legislative apportionment. After amendment to 
extend its prohibition to pending cases, the bill was passed on 
August 19 by a vote of 218-175.68 
Meanwhile, on the Senate side, a measure introduced by Senator 
Dirksen as a rider to the Foreign Aid bill had been undergoing 
revision in consultation with Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, 
Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, and Solicitor 
General Archibald Cox. As initially proposed on August 3, the 
rider was an attempt to impose on the courts a temporary mora-
torium on further apportionment litigation. The revised version 
created a presumption in favor of some delay, but left the courts 
free to proceed if they felt the public interest required it.64 The 
margin by which the Tuck bill passed the House was thought by 
many observers to be a move to place the modified Dirksen-Mansfield 
"breathing spell" measure in the position of being an acceptable 
compromise. 
Lost in the shuffle, as the weeks went by, was a proposed consti-
tutional amendment by Congressman McCulloch which had attract-
ed major attention in early July. If initiated by a two-thirds vote 
in both houses of Congress and ratified by the legislatures of three-
62. More extensive discussion, particularly of the legal basis for attempts to tamper 
by statute with the original jurisdiction of the federal district courts, the original juris• 
diction of the Supreme Court, and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
can be found in the statement attached to my testimony in Hearings on Legislative 
Apportionment and Federal Court Jurisdiction Before a Subcommittee of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). 
63. H.R. 11625, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), renumbered 11926 as modified and 
passed by the House of Representatives. 110 CONG. REc. 19580-19667 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 
1964). 
64. 110 CONG. REc. 17138 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1964), 110 CONG. REc. 18567-68 (daily 
ed. Aug. 12, 1964). 
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fourths of the states, it would permit a state to apportion one house 
of its legislature on factors other than population, provided such 
deviation in one house from the Supreme Court's equal population 
district rule was approved by the people in a popular referendum.65 
One's reaction to these proposed measures will depend in part 
upon how one assesses congressional power in the premises and in 
part upon how one views the nature of the reapportionment issue. 
There has been much extravagant talk, by normally responsible 
people, of how "one man-one vote" will usher in a millenium of 
wisdom, justice, social welfare, and revitalized state and local 
government. "One man-one vote" has become a political "Lydia 
Pinkham." But if political facts and not census formulas are to 
prevail and if "fair and effective representation" is to be the goal 
as analyzed in detail in Part I of this article, then the Re-
apportionment Decisions, and particularly the decision in the Colo-
rado case, appear as something less than the last word in America's 
quest for the democratic ideal. 
Constitutional Amendment. It is implicit in the foregoing de-
tailed analysis of the Reapportionment Decisions that the constitu-
tional amendment proposed by Congressman McCulloch should 
not be condemned out of hand. It is rather narrowly designed to 
reverse the Colorado case in which the Court prevented Colorado 
from experimenting with a plan-approved by popular referendum 
and subject to modification by further popular referenda-in 
which one house of the legislature was based substantially on popu-
lation and the other deviated from a pure population standard. 
Despite questioning by some of the power of a "malapportioned" 
legislature to ratify a constitutional amendment, the McCulloch 
Amendment probably would be constitutional. This conclusion 
finds support in the most recent constitutional amendment case, 
in which Mr. Justice Black, joined by three other Justices including 
Mr. Justice Douglas, commented that the amending process is 
" 'political' in its entirety, from submission until an amendment be-
comes part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guid-
ance, control or interference at any point."66 
But apart from constitutionality, many would question the 
65. H.R.J. Res. 1055, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). 
66. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 459 (1939). This case involved the power of 
Kansas to ratify the proposed child labor amendment after first rejecting it, and after a 
lapse of fifteen years from the date of initiation by Congress. Two other Justices, al-
though falling short of the view that the Court had no jurisdiction at all regarding 
constitutional amendments, felt that these issues at least were "political" and not sub-
ject to judicial review. 
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political wisdom and the political feasibility of adding to the Con-
stitution an amendment that might bear even a slight taint of being 
a minority imposition upon the American people. A corollary ob-
jection to the McCulloch Amendment, as it was introduced, is that 
to condition departures from the strict "one man-one vote" principle 
upon only an initial popular referendum is insufficient. A one-shot 
referendum in a state that did not have local provisions for regular 
referenda could lead to a recurrence of the problem of a political 
freeze on reapportionment that has so long plagued us in this field. 
These problems could be eased by making the following changes in 
the McCulloch Amendment: (1) addition of a provision for rati-
fication of the amendment by ratifying conventions in three-fourths 
of the states, rather than by state legislatures; and (2) addition of a 
provision to require popular referenda every ten years upon re-
apportionment plans that deviate from the population principle for 
one house of the legislature. 
As thus modified, to condemn the McCulloch Amendment would 
be to express fear of state-wide popular referenda, and that comes 
close to being afraid of majority rule. How can the people act more 
clearly or more directly than through a statewide "one man-one 
vote" referendum, uninfluenced by sub-district majorities and 
balance of power deals by cohesive minorities? Of course, where per-
sonal civil liberties and racial equality are concerned, majority rule 
should be opposed whole-heartedly. But, a minority should have 
no civil right to impose its political will upon a majority. What has 
happened to the Justice Holmes tradition, so recently championed 
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, of letting a democratic people profit 
from experience and gain strength and assurance through their own 
trial and error? Of course, initiative and referendum processes are 
not perfect; there are problems both in phrasing measures for the 
ballot and in political education; and there are equally serious prob-
lems in placing complete faith in "representative leadership." How-
ever, as former President Truman indicated, "the buck" must stop 
somewhere, and in a democracy the ultimate stopping place must 
be the people. 
Withdrawal of Court Jurisdiction. The bill introduced by Con-
gressman Tuck, as modified and passed by the House of Representa-
tives, would strip the federal courts of all jurisdiction in state legis-
lative apportionment litigation. This is a quite different matter. 
A complete withdrawal of jurisdiction would be anticonstitutional, 
if not unconstitutional. It would cut the heart out of the federal 
courts' central and vital power of constitutional adjudication. Its 
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constitutionality is subject to question, despite some favorable 
precedents dealing with congressional power to regulate by statute 
both federal district court jurisdiction and Supreme Court appellate 
jurisdiction. 67 Broad congressional power over federal district court 
jurisdiction is supported by precedents derived from the Norris-La 
Guardia Act68 and the Emergency Price Control Act, 69 but the 
Portal-to-Portal Act litigation70 may cast some doubt on power to 
withdraw jurisdiction over personal constitutional claims, particu-
larly if retroactivity also is present. 
Some commentators assert that the famous Ex parte Mccardle 
case71 would justify such a broad exercise of congressional power over 
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. In McCardle, the Supreme 
Court for the third time72 avoided the issue of the constitutionality 
of Reconstruction legislation by acquiescing in a habeas corpus re-
peal statute that had the effect of withdrawing from the Court juris-
diction over a case already argued and awaiting final decision. 
Mccardle could be viewed as a war-related political question case, 
although, to be sure, the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Chase does 
not read that way. However, taking McCardle at face value, it may 
be simply wrong. The argument would be that the "exceptions" 
clause in article III of the Constitution only gives Congress some 
power of tidying up and easing the Supreme Court's burden on 
inconsequential matters; the clause does not give Congress a power 
to upset the separation of powers system by impeding or blocking 
the Court's central power of constitutional adjudication. 
In view of the special setting of the Mccardle case and the fact 
that its short opinion discusses none of the larger issues, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that the Supreme Court has not definitively 
resolved the apparent conflict between the "exceptions" clause of 
article III and the spirit of the rest of the article, as developed in 
our tradition of judicial review. The most recent Supreme Court 
reference to the matter suggests as much. In Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 
67. For general references, see HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953); WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS (1963); 
Hart, The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise 
in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. IS62 (1953); Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court's Ap-
pellate Jurisdiction Historical Basis, 47 MINN. L. REv. 53 (1962); Ratner, Congressional 
Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 157 
(1960). 
68. Lau£ v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938). 
69. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943). 
70. Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948). 
71. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 516 (1868). 
72. Two earlier unsuccessful attempts were Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 
(1867), and Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867). 
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there is a dictum in the opinion of the Court written by Mr. Justice 
Harlan that seemingly accepts the Mccardle precedent.73 To this, 
Mr. Justice Douglas, in dissent, reacted by saying: "There is a serious 
question whether the Mccardle case could command a majority 
view today."74 Mr. Justice Harlan himself went on to note that, de-
spite the Mccardle precedent, the Court refused to apply a with-
drawal of jurisdiction statute "to a case in which the claimant had 
already been adjudged entitled to recover by the Court of Claims, 
calling it an unconstitutional attempt to invade the judicial province 
by prescribing a rule of decision in a pending case.''75 He cited 
United States v. Klein.76 
Congressional power over the Supreme Court's original jurisdic-
tion seems to be nonexistent. The Constitution clearly specifies two 
headings of original jurisdiction for the Supreme Court, and there 
are no qualifying phrases or authorizations to Congress to make an 
exception. This apparent lack of congressional power is immaterial 
to our inquiry, however, because analysis produces at least three 
reasons why reapportionment does not fall within the Supreme 
Court's original jurisdiction. First, if viewed as suits against states 
by the states' own citizens, they would be barred by the eleventh 
amendment as broadly construed by the Supreme Court. Second, if 
by virtue of the Ex parte Young doctrine, 77 they are not viewed as 
being suits against a "state" within the meaning of the eleventh 
amendment, then, by analogy, the suits should not be viewed as 
suits involving a "state" as a "party" within the meaning of those 
terms as used in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction clause 
in article III, section 2, paragraph 2. Third, wholly apart from the 
eleventh amendment, both the text and the interpretations of 
article III indicate that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court extends only to a limited category of suits in which a state is 
a party and can not be stretched to cover a state legislative reappor-
tionment suit that is brought by the state's own citizens.78 
Moratorium on Court Exercise of Jurisdiction. A step removed 
from Congressman Tuck's frontal assault upon federal court jurisdic-
tion to entertain constitutional controversies was Senator Dirksen's 
proposal for a temporary moratorium on exercise of federal court 
73. 370 U.S. 530, 567 (1962). 
74. Id. at 605, n.11. 
75. Id. at 568. 
76. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). 
77. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
78. HART&: WECHSLER., op. cit. supra note 53, at 225-27. 
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jurisdiction over state legislative apportionment and districting.79 
As a mandatory order to delay action on constitutional litigation, 
the Dirksen proposal, as initially introduced on August 3, 1964, 
seemed to be subject to the same reservations concerning its constitu-
tionality and the same objections on policy grounds as apply to the 
Tuck bill. For Congress by statute to tamper with federal court 
jurisdiction over federal constitutional issues would be to shift from 
a system of separation of powers to a system of legislative supremacy. 
However, as revised in conferences with Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral Katzenbach and Solicitor General Cox and co-sponsored by Sena-
tor Mansfield, the Dirksen-Mansfield "rider" or amendment to the 
Foreign Aid Bill was quasi-advisory and in the nature of a "stay."80 
Upon application of any interested party, courts were to grant a stay, 
"in the absence of highly unusual circumstances." The stay would 
have permitted use until January I, 1966, of unmodified apportion-
ment provisions. It further would have allowed the legislature in 
regular session or the people by state constitutional amendment 
process a reasonable opportunity to reapportion after a state's appor-
tionment provisions have been declared unconstitutional. The re-
vised "rider" also endorsed, in principle, federal court action on 
state legislative apportionment by authorizing federal district courts 
to apportion a state in the event the state fails to reapportion during 
the period of the stay. 
If one can rise above the emotionalism the controversy has 
aroused and eschew over-simplified appeals in terms of rural sinners 
and urban saints in favor of a concern for fair representation, the 
revised Dirksen-Mansfield proposal may be seen to have presented a 
special case. The separation of powers doctrine might still be asserted. 
But apparently, Justice Department officials were persuaded that the 
revised language could rest on congressional power under section 
5 of the fourteenth amendment, which authorizes legislation imple-
menting the substantive provisions of section 181-a power particu-
larly relevant when massive restructuring of government is at issue 
rather than mere vindication of a simple, personal civil right. On 
policy grounds, it could have been argued that the Dirksen-Mansfield 
"rider" would have done no more than urge the courts to grant at 
least a short grace period for the conceptually difficult area of legis-
lative apportionment, a grace period comparable to the longer period 
79. 110 CONG. REc. 17138 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1964) (introduced); 110 CoNG, REc. 17482 
(daily ed. Aug. 5, 1964) (reported by Judiciary Committee). 
80. ll0 CONG. REc. 18567-68 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1964); and see N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 
1964, p. 19, cols. 1-2. 
81. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1964, § E, p. 3, col. 7. 
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already voluntarily granted by the courts in the conceptually simple 
area of desegregation of public education. 
But, also on policy grounds, the Dirksen-Mansfield "rider" was 
too broad. It would have blocked all federal court apportionment 
action during the period of the stay, not merely action designed to 
put at least one house of a state legislature on a straight population 
basis. As such, it was not coterminous with the main line of discus-
sion of the Reapportionment Decisions or with the proposed 
McCulloch constitutional amendment, which seeks to exempt only 
one house from the strict equal population district rule. The issue 
is not one of restoring Old Sarum-type rotten boroughs; rather, the 
issue is whether the complementary goals of majority rule and fair 
representation of parties and groups can adequately be attained by 
using a bicameral formula that considers only bare numbers. 
• • * 
The denouement of the Dirksen-Mansfield "rider" debate was 
passage by the Senate in a colorful session on September 24, 1964, 
of a weakened "sense of Congress" version introduced by Majority 
Leader Mansfield alone. 82 This measure then died when the House 
failed to take further action before adjournment. One may speculate 
what might have resulted had the House on the eve of the Demo-
cratic National Convention in August passed the Dirksen-Mansfield 
compromise measure rather than the Tuck bill. Had this been done, 
the Congress might have come back from the Democratic National 
Convention with its business so arranged as to make almost certain 
the enactment of the Dirksen-Mansfield compromise. By September 
1 the Congress might have been able to move on to the more impor-
tant matter of the content of a possible constitutional amendment. 
Instead, the drastic Tuck bill produced an angry reaction and the 
Dirksen-Mansfield measure suffered a fatal loss of momentum. 
Out of this welter of activity, however, a "sense of Congress" for 
some delay was clearly expressed by both houses. Its effect, or lack 
of effect, on the courts was signalled by the federal district court's 
action in the Virginia case in ordering reapportionment by Decem-
ber 15, 1964, and cutting in half the terms of certain senators,83 
and by Mr. Chief Justice Warren's denial of a stay.84 
Further action on a constitutional amendment of the type 
proposed by Congressman McCulloch is anticipated in the new 
congressional session beginning January 1965. However, the political 
82. llO CONG. REC. 22051 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1964). 
83. Washington Post, Oct. I, 1964, p. Bl, col. 2. 
84. New York Times, Oct. 29, 1964, p. I, col. 5. 
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map of America may be so extensively altered within a few months 
by the reapportionment suits already concluded or moving toward 
finality that it is doubtful that an amendment, even if approved, 
would have major impact. Refinements of the "one man-one vote" 
principle in regard to gerrymandering, multi-member district sys-
tems, and devices to achieve equitable minority representation may 
occupy the center of the stage. 
APPENDIX 
STATISI'ICAL MEAsURES OF "MAI.APPORTIONMENT" IN THE FIFTEEN STATE LEGISLATURES 
HELD UNCONSrITUTIONAL BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 
JUNE 15 AND JUNE 22, 1964 
Minimum population 
theoretically able 
to control a majority Population variance 
of the seats ratio 
State Senate House Senate House 
Alabama 
Existing apport. 25.1% 25.7% 41-1 16-1 
67 Senator Amendmt. 19.4% 43.0% 59-1 4.7-1 
Crawford-Webb Act 27.6% 37.0% 20·1 5-1 
Colorado 
Existing apport. 
(Amendmt. No. 7) 33.2% 45.1% 3.6-1 I.7-1 
Prior apport. 29.8% 32.1% 8-1 8-1 
Delaware 
Existing apport. 
(1963 Amendmt.) 21.0% 28.0% 15-1 12-1 
Prior apport. 22.0% 18.5% 15-1 35-1 
Maryland 
Existing apport. 
(1962 revision of 
lower house) 14.1% 35.6% 32-1 6-1 
Prior apport. 14.1% 24.7% 32-1 12-1 
New York 
Existing apport. 41.8% 34.7% 3.9-1 21·1 
Projected apport. (under 
revision due by 1966 
under state constit. 
standards.) 38.1% 37.5% 2.6-1 12.7-1 
Virginia 41.1% 40.5% 2.65-1 4.36-1 
Connecticut 32.0% 12.0% 8.1-1 424.6-1 
Florida 14.1% 22.9% 38.1-1 23.3-1 
Idaho 16.6% 32.7% 102.2-1 17.0-1 
Illinois 28.7% 39.9% 10.6-1 4.9-1 
Iowa 35.2% 26.9% 8.9-1 16.8-1 
Michigan 29.0% 44.0% 12.4-1 3.9-1 
Ohio 41.0% 30.3% 1.9-1 9.4-1 
Oklahoma 24.5% 29.5% 26.4-1 13.9-1 
Washington 33.9% 35.3% 7.3-1 4.6-1 
Source: The figures for the first six states listed, Alabama through Virginia, are taken 
from the Supreme Court opinions as reported in 377 U.S. 533 et seq. (1964). The 
figures for the last nine states, Connecticut through Washington, are taken from 
Nat. Munic. League, Compendium on Legislative Apportionment, 1963 Supple-
mental Chart. 
Note: The first six cases were decided with full opinions after oral argument. The last 
nine were noted as memorandum decisions without oral argument. 
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HISTORICAL APPENDIX 
(APPORTIONMENT UNDER THE ORIGINAL CoNsrITUTIONS OF THE FIFrY STATES) 
In the majority opinion in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the principal 
opinion in the Reapportionment Dedsions of June 15, 1964, Mr. Chief Justice Warren, 
relying on the United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
[Commission Report, Apportionment of State Legislatures, 10·11, 35, 69 (1962)] said: 
"The original constitutions of 36 of our States provided that representation in both 
houses of the state legislatures would be based completely, or predominantly, on 
population." The same comment has been made by others and figured prominently in 
the House Judiciary Committee hearings on legislative apportionment and court 
jurisdiction in July-August 1964. The implication is that the Reapportionment Ded-
sions are not so much ground-breaking decisions as they are a return to the original 
understandings. 
The tabulation of the U.S. Advisory Commission uses gross categories and is not 
detailed state by state. An independent analysis of the texts of the original constitutions 
of the fifty states, giving due regard to the numerous qualifications and provisos which 
were used to limit the pure population principle, yields somewhat different figures. 
Instead of thirty-six out of fifty in favor of a substantially unmodified population 
principle, it appears that thirty-two upper houses and twenty-six lower houses were 
based on a substantially unqualified population principle (totals given in parentheses 
in chart). To reach this total there would have to be a transfer to category IV of 
those states listed exclusively in category III (c) and not tied to III by appearing in 
III(a) or III(b). [III(d) can be ignored as far as totals are concerned because it is a 
wholly overlapping category.] These figures-thirty-two upper houses and twenty-six 
lower houses originally on a population basis-do not indicate the full extent of infla-
tion in the Advisory Commission statement that both houses of thirty-six states 
originally were on a population basis. To derive the comparable figure from this chart 
requires ascertaining the states, both houses of which are in categories IV and V, as 
amplified by transfer of III(c). That figure is only twenty-one, not thirty-six. Com-
plexities and ambiguities in the constitutional texts make full agreement on classifica-
tion impossible and suggest, at the very least, tJ:ie danger of placing much reliance on 
attempts to segregate the states into gross and overly simple categories of population 
states and non-population states. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court, by refer-
ring to the data, implied that accurate and agreed-upon classification was a simple 
matter-or even possible. 
Category IIl(c), which is the most difficult one to classify, has an apparent anti-
gerrymandering spirit which is laudable but which also could make equality difficult 
to achieve because of the rule against dividing a county in forming a district. If cate-
gory III(c) is counted as charted, as deviating materially from a relatively pure popula-
tion principle, then the totals diverge even more sharply from the Advisory Commis-
sion figures: only fourteen upper houses and twenty lower houses would have been 
based upon a substantially unqualified population principle. Data on the actual 
implementation of these sometimes ambiguous state constitutional clauses has never 
been collected, but comments of historians-Thorpe, Nevins, Luce, Main-indicate 
that population disparities among representative districts have been an endemic feature 
of the American scene. 
The details are shown in the accompanying chart, in the preparation of which the 
author is indebted to the Rockport Fund of George Washington University Law 
School and Miss Dulcey A. Brown, third-year student and member of the Law Review 
staff. For similar charts on the situation on the eve of Baker v. Carr, and after one year 
of reapportionment activity, see Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal 
Constitution, 27 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 329, 387 (1962), and Dixon, Apportionment 
Standards and ]udidal Power, 38 NoTRE DAME LAw. 367, 498-400 (1963). 
• • • 
FORMAL APPORTIONMENT FORMULAE OF STATE LEGISLATURES IN ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONS 
A. Political Subdivision or Mixed Population-Geographic Principle 
Basis of Representation upper House Lower House 
I. Representation Based on Geographic 
Units without Regard to Population 
(a) Equal Representation for each County 
(b) Representation Based on Geographic 
Units other than Counties (including 
districts initially devised according to 
population but fixed in Constitution) 
II. Representation Based on Geographic 
Units with Minor Modification Based 
on Populationb 
III. Representation Proportioned to Units 
Based on Population with Major 
Limitations to Achieve Geographic 
Diffusion which may Substantially 
Defeat Population Principle or to 































































































A. Political Subdivision or Mixed Population-Geographic Principle (cont.) 
Basis of Representation Upper Rouse 
(a) Minimum Limits, e.g., rule that 
no unit may have less than one 
representative 
(b) Maximum Limits, e.g., rule that no 
unit may have more than designated 
number of representatives 
(c) Contiguity Requirements, e.g., rule 
that counties constituting elective unit 
shall not be separated by county belonging 
to another elective unit and that no county 
_shall be divided in forming such unit 
(d) Low Limit on Maximum Size of Legislature 
(in relation to number of counties) when 




























































































FORMAL APPORTIONMENT FORMULAE OF STATE LEGISLATURES IN ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONS (cont.) 
B. Population Principle, Substantially Unqualified 
Basis of Representation Upper House Lower House 
IV. Representation to be Apportioned 
on Population Basis with Apparently 
Minor Limitations 

















(32, including III(c)) 






















(26, including III(c)) 
b Some states may be classified either to II or III, depending on the weight given to special constitutional formulae. The distinction may not be 
vital, however, because the primary thrust of both II and Ill is toward geographic diffusion, not representation strictly by population. 
c Some states charted in this category have special formulae not easily classifiable but weighted more to population principle than geographic 
diffusion. 
d Only forty-seven upper legislative houses (thirty-three in chart A and fourteen in chart B) are listed because the first constitutions of Georgia, 
Pennsylvania, and Vermont provided for unicameral legislatures. 
SOURCE: THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 
Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 7 VOLS. (1906); state codes. 
• NoTE. ADDITION TO NOTE 30 supra: At page proof stage, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded Scranton v. Drew, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3181 
(Nov. 16, 1964) (No. 201). It noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had invalidated a new reapportionment statute and assumed an active role. 
Butcher v. Bloom, 203 A.2d 556 (Pa. 1964). Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had suggested the unconstitutionality of multi-member dis-
tricts in some situations, the issue remains alive. The concurring opinion of Chief Justice Bell said the United States Supreme Court, in its handling 
of the apportionment matter, had "overlooked the problem of adequate representation of minority groups." 203 A.2d at 573. 
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